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Abstract
The vulnerability to slight input perturbations is a worrying yet intriguing prop-
erty of deep neural networks (DNNs). Despite many previous works studying
the reason behind such adversarial behavior, the relationship between the gener-
alization performance and adversarial behavior of DNNs is still little understood.
In this work, we reveal such relation by introducing a metric characterizing the
generalization performance of a DNN. The metric can be disentangled into an
information-theoretic non-robust component, responsible for adversarial behavior,
and a robust component. Then, we show by experiments that current DNNs rely
heavily on optimizing the non-robust component in achieving decent performance.
We also demonstrate that current state-of-the-art adversarial training algorithms
indeed try to robustify the DNNs by preventing them from using the non-robust
component to distinguish samples from different categories. Also, based on our
findings, we take a step forward and point out the possible direction for achieving
decent standard performance and adversarial robustness simultaneously. We be-
lieve that our theory could further inspire the community to make more interesting
discoveries about the relationship between standard generalization and adversarial
generalization of deep learning models.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved enormous success in many different tasks [14] over
the last decade. There is a major line of works trying to boost the performance of deep learning
models from different aspects [8, 9, 11, 12, 25, 27]. While the community is devoting to achieve
new state-of-the-art performance with DNNs, some researchers [28] identify these powerful models
are susceptible to perturbations that are even imperceptible by human. Consequently, a solid body
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of works have been developed on both finding the most effective attacks [7, 13, 19, 33] as well as
obtaining relatively more adversarial robust models [7, 17, 18, 32]. Specifically, in [33], the authors
provide theoretic derivation on how Fisher information of the model’s output w.r.t input characterizes
the adversarial behavior around input.
Exploiting the model’s ability to stay adversarial robust [17, 18] also reveals a non-trivial degradation
in standard performance as a cost of being relatively more adversarial robust, which has attracted
much attention recently. Some works [10, 20, 24, 26, 29] have emerged to try to understand this
apparently trade-off between standard generalization and adversarial generalization. For example,
in [10], the authors provide a novel view point that adversarial samples are non-robust features that
could help the generalization of deep learning models and validate their conjecture by experiments.
In this work, however, we theoretically reveal the relationship between standard performance as well
as adversarial behavior of deep learning models with Taylor expansion of Kullback–Leibler divergence
(KL divergence) and Fisher information. Interestingly, we show that the overall performance objective
could be disentangled into a non-robust component, which has the side effects of causing adversarial
behavior, as well as a robust component. Our analysis shows that it is indeed the fact that adversarial
robustness and high standard performance are contradictory as the non-robust component, which
contribute to the standard performance also cause adversarial behavior.
The accuracy on test set is usually used to measure the performance of machine learning models for
classification tasks. In this work, to investigate the adversarial behavior of DNNs, we propose to
transform such performance metric into the KL divergence between output distributions of test set
samples from different categories. This new objective could not only perfectly characterize how well
the model distinguishes samples from different categories, but also connect model performance and
its adversarial behavior tightly. The developed theory conveys that the overall performance objective
could be disentangled into a non-robust component, which has the side effects of causing adversarial
behavior, as well as a robust component.
We also demonstrate by experiments that current deep learning models rely heavily on the non-robust
component to generalize, which is the underlying reason for adversarial behavior in trained deep
learning models. In addition, we show that state-of-the-art adversarial training algorithms are all
trying to constrain the model from using the non-robust components. Based on the above findings,
we suggest that there might exist a perfect balance point for the deep learning models to possess
decent standard generalization ability while stay adversarial robust.
Our contribution is summarized as follows.
• We propose a new metric that could both characterize the standard performance and better
connect with adversarial behavior of DNNs.
• By properly expanding our metric with Fisher information, we quantitatively explain the
relationship between standard performance and adversarial robustness of DNNs.
• We then take a step forward and point out possible direction for achieving decent standard
performance and adversarial robustness simultaneously.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks and Defense To study the adversarial behavior of deep learning models,
many algorithms in terms of both finding the most effective adversarial perturbation and improving
adversarial robustness of the deep learning system have been proposed recently. [7] proposes an
one-step attack algorithm based on gradient of the deep learning models called fast gradient sign
method (FGSM), [21] propose an attack algorithm based on jacobian saliency map, [19] proposes an
attack algorithm based on Newton’s iterative algorithm for finding roots of a non-linear function. [22]
proposes a training mechanism for defense based on distillation while [3] proposes the "CW attack"
that could render the distillation defense mechanism useless. [13] proposes an iterative version
of the FGSM attack, and [17] suggests that the adversarial training based on projected gradient
descent attack algorithm has universal defense effects. [18] proposes the distribution smoothing
training strategy for defense in both supervised and semi-supervised learning setting. [33] studies
the adversarial attack under the Fisher information metric and uses the power method to solve
eigenvectors of the Fisher information matrix, where the eigenvector of the greatest eigenvalue is
treated as the attack noise.
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Fisher Information in Deep Learning [4] uses Fisher information matrix as a metric that induces
distance on parameter manifold and develops an regularization term for incremental learning. The
concept of Fisher information is also widely applied in deep learning algorithm based on natural
gradient descent [6, 23], as well as meta-learning [1, 2]. In these works, they usually view the
parameter of the model as the parameter of the Fisher information matrix. Recently, [18, 33] propose
to use Fisher information to represent the local geometry of the log-likelihood landscape of the deep
learning model so that the adversarial behavior could be better studied. In these two works, however,
they view the input of the deep learning model as Fisher information’s parameter instead. We also
adopt the same definition for Fisher information as [18, 33] to better study the relationship between
the standard performance and adversarial robustness of the model.
Adversarial Behavior of DNNs Previously, there are a line of works trying to explain the robust
model’s degradation in standard performance [20, 24, 26, 29, 32]. In these work, they all start by
studying the accuracy of the model, and sometimes with relatively strong assumptions. The recent
literature [10] also empirically shows that adversarial samples are features that help the standard
generalization of deep learning models by disentangling non-robust and robust features. In our work,
we theoretically point out that it is indeed the fact that what causes adversarial behavior also helps
boost the model’s performance with little assumptions. Our theory, however, doesn’t indicate that
achieving decent performance and being adversarial robust are two completely contradict objectives.
It is still possible that there exist a perfect balance point where both objectives could be satisfied
simultaneously.
3 Disentanglement of the Performance Metric
We present our main results in this section. We first propose to transform the standard testing-accuracy
based performance metric to a KL divergence based one. Then with the newly formed objective, we
derive the performance of a DNN model is indeed determined by two disentangled components and it
is one of them that introduces the model adversarial behavior. We finally conclude this section by
presenting some complementary understandings from the viewpoint of information geometry.
3.1 Proposed performance metric
Prediction accuracy on test set is typically adopted to measure performance of a DNN model in
the literature. However, such metric indeed hides the connection between the model performance
and its adversarial behavior. In this work, in order to build more transparent connection and better
understand model adversarial behavior, we propose to adopt the average KL divergence between
output distribution of any pair of data of different categories as the classification performance metric.
We denote x as the input image and y as the corresponding one-hot label distribution, f as the model
and yˆ = f(x) as the output distribution of the model, Npair as the number of pairs of input data with
different labels, JS(f(xi)‖f(xj)) as the Jensen-Shannon divergence between f(xi) and f(xj). We
propose to adopt the objective as Cross Category KL Divergence (CCKL):
CCKL =
1
2Npair
∑
∀yi 6=yj
KL(f(xi)||f(xj)). (1)
By Lin’s inequality [15], we can derive the following lower bound from triangular inequality for
describing the relation between the widely used cross entropy loss and our proposed objective (1):
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) ≥ 2JS(yi‖yj)−KL(yi‖f(xi))−KL(yj‖f(xj)),∀yi 6= yj , (2)
where JS(yi‖yj) denotes the Jensen-Shannon divergence between yi and yj . This lower bound of
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) effectively characterizes its behavior along the training process. As the lower
bound indicates, the training error KL(yi‖f(xi)) decreases so the whole lower bound increases
during training process.
We can also view this from another perspective. When randomly initialized, a DNN f does not
have any knowledge for classifying samples correctly. Therefore, it does not distinguish different
inputs xi, xj , and the output distributions shall be similar, as shown in Figure 1. That is to say,
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) shall be relatively small at the very beginning of the training stage. As training
proceeds, more label dependent information is integrated into the model fθ. The network becomes
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of howKL(f(x1)‖f(x2)) evolves during training, (left) ground-truth
label, (middle) network outputs when initialized, (right) network outputs when optimum reached.
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Figure 2: Visualization of how (left) accuracy, (middle) cross entropy loss and (right) CCKL on test
set evolve when training VGG13 on CIFAR-10. It is clear that CCKL well indicates test accuracy
and cross-entropy training loss.
better for generalization and the output distribution fθ(x) on test set gets closer to the true label
distribution y. At late training stage, the model loss KL(y‖f(x)) on average will decrease to
relatively small value. By continuity of KL divergence, KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) will be sufficiently close
to KL(yi‖yj) as shown in Figure 1.
This proposed measure could better characterize how well the model distinguish the input data from
data of other categories. To further expound on our point, we provide a visualization about this
relationship in Figure 2.
3.2 Connections Between Adversarial Behavior and CCKL
We now explain how the above CCKL objective could be connected to the model’s adversarial
behavior. In most previous literature [7, 13, 17], the following cross entropy loss of the model fθ on
adversarial samples (with perturbation η)
min
θ
max
η
KL(y‖fθ(x+ η))
is adopted to study adversarial behavior of the DNNs. As training proceeds and the parameter θ
approaches the optimum, the output distribution fθ(x) will be close to true label y. In this situation,
since KL divergence is continuous in the first variable so we have
KL(y‖fθ(x+ η)) ≈ KL(fθ(x)‖fθ(x+ η)).
This observation inspires us to study the model adversarial behavior from a distribution point of view,
as explored in [18, 32, 33]. Instead of viewing the output of fθ as a single scalar, we treat the model
fθ as a function that outputs a prediction distribution over the input. Thus we use the KL divergence
between the output distribution over the original samples and adversarial samples to characterize the
model’s adversarial behavior.
In order to better connect adversarial behavior with the CCKL proposed before, we define the
following adversarial measure built upon the above relation:
Lθ(x, η) = KL(fθ(x)‖fθ(x+ η)). (3)
The objective of the corresponding adversarial training is thus formulated as follow:
min
θ
max
η
Lθ(x, η) s.t. ‖η‖ ≤ . (4)
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Based on the distribution point of view, [33] reports state-of-the-art results in the task of adversarial
attack and [32] reports the state-of-the-art results in adversarial robustness. Therefore, using (3)
instead of the cross entropy loss on adversarial samples to represent adversarial behavior is further
justified.
Given the definition of Lθ(x, η), applying Taylor expansion yields the following:
max
η
Lθ(x, η) = max
η
η>Fxη +
∞∑
k=3
T (k)x (η) s.t. ‖η‖ ≤ . (5)
where Fx is the Fisher information of f(x) w.r.t. x. Let fj(x) be the j-th entry of f(x) and n be the
number of entries of f(x). Then Fx can be calculated by:
Fx =
n∑
j=0
fj(x)(∇x log fj(x))(∇x log fj(x))>. (6)
When  is sufficiently small, higher order terms in the above would vanish and (5) could be simplified
into:
max
η
L(x, η) = max
η
η>Fxη s.t. ‖η‖ ≤ . (7)
By setting ∇ηL = 0, we obtain Fxη = λmaxη, where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of Fx.
Therefore, the solution to the overall adversarial objective corresponds to the leading eigenvector of
Fx. Consequently, we have:
L(x, η) ≤ λmax2 s.t. ‖η‖ ≤ . (8)
Note that λmax here is also the spectral norm of the Fisher information matrix Fx. The above
derivation shows that the local adversarial behavior of the model f around input x is determined by
the spectral norm of Fisher information matrix: the adversarial behavior around x would be more
severe if the spectral norm of Fx is larger.
Given two data-label pairs (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) with yi 6= yj , we could rewrite KL(f(xi)‖f(xj))
as:
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) = KL(f(xi)‖f(xi + (xi − xj))) = L(xi, xj − xi). (9)
Therefore, we apply the same Taylor expansion as above and obtain:
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) = L(xi, xj − xi) = (xj − xi)>Fxi(xj − xi) +
∞∑
k=3
T (k)xi (xj − xi). (10)
Comparing (10) and (7), we could further notice that they share the same Fisher information Fxi .
Therefore, the adversarial behavior at each data point and performance objective CCKL could be
connected by Fisher information at each data point.
Cramér-Rao bound The adversarial training proposed in the paragraphs above constrains the input-
output Fisher information of a DNN model. This constrain is a criteria of a good DNN model due to
the following reasons. Recall the well-known Cramér-Rao bound
var(xˆ)Fx ≥ 1
says that if we try to use the output probability f(x) to a statistics xˆ to reconstruct the input x, the
uncertainty in terms of variance var(xˆ) is bounded below by the inverse of Fisher information Fx.
For a DNN model that represents the reality, when it classifies an image with a correct label, say a
dog, the label does not have any information about the environments - what color the dog is, where is
the dog, adversarial perturbation, etc. Therefore, one cannot use the information contained in the
label to reconstruct the original image. This means that the variance var(xˆ) of any statistics xˆ derived
from output distribution f(x) is relatively large for a good DNN model. In view of Cramer-Rao
bound, this implies that the Fisher information of a DNN is a relatively small value.
3.3 Disentanglement of the Performance Metric
In this section, we reveal the proposed performance objective, unifying measure of perfor-
mance and robustness, could be decomposed into two components. To see this, we first denote
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
training epoch
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
ac
cu
ra
cy
baseline
Madry PGD
KL smooth
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
training epoch
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
Lo
g 
Av
er
ag
e 
Fi
sh
er
 F
-n
or
m
baseline
Madry PGD
KL smooth
Figure 4: Visualization of how (left) standard test accuracy and (right) average F-norm of Fisher
Information Matrix on test set vary during nature training and adversarial training with VGG13 on
CIFAR-10 (for the same experiments for ResNet see section A of appendix). We take the logarithm
to better visualize the average F-norm of Fisher information.
(xj − xi)>Fxi(xj − xi) in (10) as G1 and the following terms
∑∞
k=3 T
(k)
xi (xj − xi) as G2. Thus
KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)) could be formulated as:
KL(f(x1)‖f(x2)) = G1 +G2. (11)
Taking a closer look into (11), we could notice that the increase of G1 and G2 could both contribute
to the rise of KL(f(xi)‖f(xj)), which is the performance objective. Note that since G1 is a second
order polynomial induced by Fxi , and (xj − xi) is fixed distance between two input xi and xj ,
the rise of G1 would asymptotically result in the rise of norm of Fxi . That is to say, if the model
rely heavily on the increase of G1 to boost performance, the norm of Fxi would have to increase
drastically. However, according to (8) and our derivation before, the rise in spectral norm of Fxi
means more severe adversarial behavior around xi. The trade off between standard performance
and adversarial behavior is thus clearly characterized here: the model could rely on G1 to boost
performance, but it comes with the side effect of more severe adversarial behavior. What should
also be noted, however, is that G2 also contributes to the overall performance objective while not
involves in the adversarial objective. Therefore, relying on terms in G2 to distinguish xi from data
belonging to other categories would not cause adversarial behavior. Therefore, we successfully
disentangled the non-robust component and robust component in the overall performance objective.
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Figure 3: Visualization of how standard accuracy
and average F-norm of Fisher information matrix
on test set vary during training. The experiment
is conducted on a VGG13 model and CIFAR-10
data set (for the same experiment for ResNet see
section A of appendix). We take the logarithm
to better visualize the average F-norm of Fisher
information.
To further understand the role of G1 in clas-
sification, we visualize how F-norm of Fisher
information evolves during training. Note that
we visualize F-norm instead of spectral norm be-
cause all norms are equivalent and spectral norm
is not computation feasible in our case. We first
empirically show how the average F-norm of
Fisher information on the test set and standard
test accuracy vary during nature training process.
The visualization is in Figure 3. According to
the statistics, we could observe that the norm
of Fisher information increase drastically with
the rise of accuracy, which indicates that current
deep learning model rely heavily on the non-
robust component G1 to boost performance.
Then we compare nature training with the two
state-of-the-art adversarial training algorithms
[17, 32] using the same visualization method.
The result is shown in Figure 4. It is clear that
during adversarial training, although the Fisher
information’s average F-norm also rises with
standard accuracy, the values of which is significantly smaller than its counterpart during nature
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training. That is to say, the adversarial training process could effectively constraint the model from
using Fisher information in boosting performance.
Our experiments also demonstrate the widely known but little understood fact that the standard
accuracy of models under the two adversarial training algorithms are significantly lower than their
counterpart under nature training. According to our theory, it is because they are unable to effectively
rely on adversary-prone non-robust components such as Fisher information to distinguish the input
data from data belonging to other categories. Therefore, we theoretically and empirically demonstrate
the relationship between standard accuracy and adversarial robustness using the disentanglement
proposed.
3.4 Explanation From Geometry Point of View
We provide some explanations on the above findings from the information geometry viewpoint.
We note that along with the training process, the model is doing maximum likelihood estimation
approximately by learning to fit the label distribution over the training data. It thus can be viewed as
a process that the log-likelihood landscape of the model on training data is gradually transiting into
a state where the model could distinguish data of different categories well. On the other hand, the
training data is very sparsely sampled from the whole distribution. Therefore, during the formation
of the model’s log-likelihood landscape, smoothness prior does not hold. Without such property, the
model could easily use lower order local geometric descriptor such as Fisher information—the local
curvature of the log-likelihood landscape—to form an overly simplified log-likelihood landscape
that is adversary-prone due to lacking of smoothness. When applying adversarial training, a strong
smoothness property is enforced and the model would have to rely on higher-order global geometric
descriptor that vanishes locally to form the whole landscape. Thus the landscape could be more
robust to adversarial samples.
4 Towards Simultaneous Good Performance and Robustness
With the disentanglement introduced above, it is natural to think whether it is possible to achieve
decent standard accuracy and adversarial robustness simultaneously. From our results, if relying
on the robust component alone can effectively distinguish data of different categories, obtaining an
adversarial robust model with high standard accuracy is possible.
On the other hand, the expansion terms in the robust component are all higher order terms. Therefore,
we suggest that the key to achieve the two desired qualities simultaneously is to increase the expressive
power of model so that the model would have the ability to utilize the higher order terms for prediction.
In this way, the model wouldn’t have to rely heavily on Fisher information while still have decent
standard performance with higher order terms (the robust component). Our disentanglement provides
theoretical justification about the importance of model complexity in achieving adversarial robust
and relatively decent standard performance.
We also designed experiments on CIFAR-10 to provide insights into this possible strategy of achieving
the two objective simultaneously. We train the following models with TRADES algorithm [32]: a pure
linear VGG13 model without ReLU and with average pooling, a half linear VGG13 model without
ReLU but using max pooling, a normal VGG 13 model, a normal resnet20 model and a resnet32
model with 10× more channels. We evaluate these model on standard samples and adversarial
samples produced by L∞ PGD attack [17] and CW attack [3]. The results and experimental details
are provided in Table 1.
We first compare VGG models. Pure linear VGG13 model is not complex enough to exploit higher
order information for decision making during adversarial training. Thus, it cannot effectively leverage
the lower order terms for prediction and achieves very poor accuracy on both standard and adversarial
samples. However, as the non-linearity of the model increase (the half linear and normal VGG13
models), the performance on standard and adversarial samples improves simultaneously. For resnet
models, when the model is shallower and narrower (resnet20x1), the performance in both standard and
adversarial settings are relatively low. However, with a deeper and wider resnet model (resnet32x10),
the model could explore more higher order information for prediction, so the performance on standard
samples and adversarial samples increases significantly.
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Table 1: The standard accuracy and accuracy on adversary of models of different complexity trained
by [32]. We set the maximum allowed L∞ norm of attack noise  = 8/255. The learning rate
0.01 for all VGG13 models and 0.1 for all resnet models. All models are trained with SGD for 160
epochs with a decay of 10× in learning rate at 80 and 120 epochs. The SGD’s momentum is 0.9.
For adversarial training settings: the coefficient for the regularization term in [32] is 1λ = 5.0, the
step size for projected gradient descent is 2/255 and the number of step is 10. The weight decay
during training is 1e-4. For evaluation against adversarial attack, the step size for PGD attack is
2/255, the number of step is 20. The CW attack objective’s coefficient is c = 5e2 and is also solved
by PGD with the same optimization parameters. All experiments are conducted on NVIDIA Tesla
V100 GPUs.
VGG13 VGG13 VGG13 resnet20x1 resnet32x10pure linear half linear normal
accuracy 35.14 70.48 72.36 72.88 79.45(standard)
accuracy 17.06 38.52 42.29 44.94 49.52(PGD attack,  = 8/255)
accuracy 13.94 34.12 38.96 41.49 47.67(CW attack,  = 8/255)
5 Discussion
When  is NOT sufficiently small Empirically, researchers have found that the local linearity
assumption doesn’t hold when allowed norm of attack noise  is relatively larger [13, 17]. In this
case, our analysis is not so precise since higher order terms might contribute a lot in equation (10).
However, a higher order analogue of (10) and Fisher information could be available and explain the
generalization behavior and adversarial robustness. For more details on this issue, we refer the reader
to section B of appendix.
Future directions As we discussed before, our work has very strong geometry insight. Therefore,
we suggest that it is possible that analyzing the geometric properties of the log-likelihood landscape
formed by the DNNs on input data could provide us with even more interesting insights. Also, some
recent literature [5, 16, 30, 31] propose to view the deep learning model as a non-linear dynamic
system and study it from the control point of view. The reachable state-space and the stability of the
dynamic system are both widely studied in control theory, and we think that is corresponded to the
performance and robustness to input perturbation in deep learning system. Also, when the reachable
state-space of the dynamic system is large, it might be highly sensitive in certain directions in the
state-space, which could also lead to the chaotic behavior of the dynamic system. This kind of trade
off is very similar to the one that we discussed in our work. Therefore, we think it might also be
possible to characterize the relationship between standard accuracy and adversarial behavior of deep
learning models from dynamic system point of view.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we provide a novel view point on standard accuracy and adversarial robustness of
deep learning model and show that the overall performance objective could be disentangled into a
non-robust component, which is adversary-prone as well as a robust component, which is unrelated to
adversarial behavior. In this way, we theoretically explain the relationship between standard accuracy
and adversarial robustness: the cost of being adversarial robust is that the model could no longer
effectively rely on the non-robust component to distinguish input data from different categories, which
means that there is indeed a trade off between these two objectives. However, these two objectives
might not be completely contradictory to each other, as there might exist a perfect balance point where
the robust component of the model could perfectly distinguish input data from different categories
while the non-robust component is not large enough to cause severe adversarial behavior. We also
discussed the scenario where the norm of the allowed perturbation is not sufficiently small and higher
8
order terms are needed in the expansion of adversarial objective and showed that our theory still holds.
We’re confident that more interesting theory about standard accuracy and adversarial robustness could
be develop in the future based on our theory.
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A More Experiments on the Role of Fisher Information
We conduct more visualization experiments about the role of Fisher information in standard perfor-
mance of DNN. The results are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The experiments are conducted on a
resnet20 model. The same conclusion could be drawn according to our statistics.
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Figure 5: Visualization of how standard accuracy and average F-norm of Fisher information matrix
on test set vary during training. The experiment is conducted on a resnet20 model and CIFAR-10
data set. We take the logarithm to better visualize the average F-norm of Fisher information
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Figure 6: Visualization of how (left) standard test accuracy and (right) average F-norm of Fisher
Information Matrix on test set vary during nature training and adversarial training, with resnet20 on
CIFAR-10.
B Adversarial behavior in large perturbation region
We now further discuss the scenario where the norm of adversarial noise is too large that the Fisher
information alone is not enough to characterize the adversarial behavior of the model. However,
since  is still a small value, the expansion terms should still vanish at certain order K, where K is
an integer related to . Therefore, for two data-label pairs (xi, yi) and (xj , yj), where yi 6= yj , the
adversarial objective around xi should be rewritten as:
max
η
Lθ(xi, η) = max
η
η>Fxiη +
K∑
k=3
T (k)xi (η) s.t. ‖η‖ ≤ . (12)
12
We then rewrite the performance objective for better view:
L(xi, xj − xi) = G1 +G2 =
K∑
k=2
T (k)xi (xj − xi) +
∞∑
k=K+1
T (k)xi (xj − xi). (13)
Here, we see that the adversarial behavior of the model around xi is not solely related to the spectral
norm of Fxi any more—it is also related to the norm of the other K−3 multi-linear functional that
yield the other K−3 terms. Similar to the derivation before, under the attack scale of , if the model
rely heavily on the first G1 to distinguish input data from data belonging to other categories, then the
norm of the first K−2 multi-linear functional in the expansion would have to increase drastically,
and thus lead to more severe adversarial behavior around xi according to (12).
Therefore, we show that even under the scenario where  is not sufficiently small, the variant of our
disentanglement could still clearly explain the relationship between achieving high standard accuracy
and staying adversarial robust.
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